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Abstract 
 
The aim of the current study has been to highlight the theoretical precariousness of 
Psychology. The theoretical precariousness has been evidenced through a review of psychological 
“core-constructs” whose definitions were thoroughly searched in 11 popular introductory textbooks 
of psychology edited between 2012 and 2019 and in an APA dictionary of Psychology (VandeBos, 
2015). This analysis has shown unsatisfactory or discordant definitions of psychological “core-
constructs”. A further epistemological comparison between psychology and three “harder” sciences 
(i.e., physics, chemistry and biology) seemed to support the “soft” nature of psychology: a minor 
consensus in its “core” and a minor capacity to accumulate knowledge when compared to the 
former “harder” sciences (Fanelli, 2010; Fanelli & Glänzel, 2013). This comparison also seemed to 
support the  “pre-paradigmatic” condition of psychology, in which conflicts between rival schools 
of thought hamper the development of a real unified paradigm (Kuhn, 1970). To enter a 
paradigmatic stage, we propose here evolutionary psychology as the most compelling approach, 
thanks to its empirical support and theoretical consistency. However, since the skepticism about 
“grand unifying theories” is well disposed (Badcock, 2012), we suggest that evolutionary 
psychology must be intended as a pluralistic approach rather than a monolithic one, and that its 
main strength is its capacity to resolve the nature-nurture dialectics.  
 
 
Keywords: Theoretical Psychology, Philosophy of Science, Evolutionary Psychology, Introductory 
Textbooks, Theoretical definitions  
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“In psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion...The existence 
of the experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems that trouble 
us; though problem and method pass one another by”  
 
Wittgenstein L. Philosophical investigations. Oxford: Blackwell, 1953, quot. in Wakefield, 2014, p 
38. 
 
A shaky foundation: a lacking concept of “mind” 
Psychology is as an atypical science, as its main object of study is not clearly defined.   
Based on its etymology - ψυχή/psyché, soul and λογος/logos, science - it should be the “science of 
the soul” however, it is somewhat peculiar that the concept of “soul” is strongly rejected by 
scientists as a unit to be investigated. Psychologists and researchers usually limit their scientific 
focus to “mind and behavior” (see Table A1). The first signs of confusion may thus be related to the 
current use of the prefix “psych-” in all the main disciplines in this field, although its etymological 
meaning is typically refused. However, even if the term “soul” (and thus the “psych-” prefix) was 
regarded as an irrelevant historical legacy and the contemporary focus was only on the study of 
“mind and behavior”, things would not be better. In fact, the fundamental pillar of psychology, the 
concept of mind, is neither satisfactorily nor unanimously defined 1 (Table A1; Wallach e Wallach, 
2012). Remarkable efforts have been made in this respect, like the definition proposed by Siegel2 
(Siegel, 2012, 2016). This formulation might solve the issue in the near future however, it is still not 
shared by a sufficient proportion of the scientific community. Definitions of mind popular today are 
                                                 
1  Behavior is a less debated term, but still it is not as easy-to-use as it first appears, since it can be intended as 
“overt” or “covert” or both (Table A1).  
 
2  “The mind is an embodied and relational process that regulates the flow of energy and information” (Siegel, 
2012, p.3) 
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materialistic - mind interpreted exclusively as a brain activity (e.g. Cacioppo & Freberg., 2013) or, 
more often, descriptive-set - mind intended as list of activities moving within it (see Table A1).  
However, there are several critical aspects that hinder the materialistic definition 
(Porcelli, 2009; Benovsky, 2016). Among the most prominent is that there may be emergent 
properties, i.e. properties that a system shows which are not found in the single parts composing the 
system itself, and this might happen between mind and brain as well (Tononi, Sporns, & Edelman, 
1994; Edelman & Tononi, 2001; Edelman, 2003; Bedau & Humphreys, 2008). Moreover, the brain 
and the body are directly affected by the mind itself, which operates as a “social organ” that 
converts relational experiences in the brain and somatic processes (e.g. Tomasello, 1999; 2019; 
Danese et al., 2011; Lanius, Vermetten & Pain., 2010; Van der Kolk, 2015). On the other hand, the 
descriptive-set definition, although more supported than the materialistic one, seems to lack 
conceptual consistency (Table A1). Activities (such as thinking and reasoning) and concepts (such 
as cognition and emotions) included to define the mind are themselves circularly defined by the 
formulation of mind itself, therefore resulting in a vacuous recursion (Table A1-A6). For example, 
“mind” is often conceived as a list of activities that includes “thinking” or “thoughts” (Table A1), 
when, at the same time, the definition of “thinking” generally always refers to its “mental” nature as 
a characterizing feature  (Table A5).  
Most psychologists (more often implicated in practice rather than in theory)   
consider the definition of mind as a matter of no significance, leaving it to the philosophers and 
therefore unconsciously adopting an ontological approach that could insidiously affect their own 
clinical or scientific activity.   
 
An unsteady building 
This first fragile condition (that is a lacking concept of mind) is necessarily followed by 
many cumbersome consequences: most of the psychological constructs are not satisfactorily defined 
(see Table A2-A6). The cornerstones upon which psychological science is built seem to falter or fit 
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only in the context in which they have been implemented (Staats, 1999). The idea of “language-
game” (Wittgenstein, 1953) (i.e., the comprehension of a given word exclusively in the context in 
which it is used) could be called into question to depict this condition. Nevertheless, if the 
“language-game” theory works in semantics, it does not in the field of science, as it undermines 
many fundamental processes of the scientific enquiry, like replicability and inter-subjectivity 
(Wilson, 1999). Cognition, consciousness, emotion, intelligence, mind and thinking, are concepts 
usually used by psychologists and psychiatrists around the world. Nevertheless, no one seems to 
agree on what they really are (as reported from Table A1 to Table A6). Several other terms might be 
less debated, presenting a larger degree of agreement (i.e., attention, behavior,decision-making, 
language,  learning, memory, motivation, reasoning, perception, problem-solving, and 
sensation). 
However, a real accordance is far from reached; more importantly, these concepts are often 
ambiguous, overlapping and circularly defined by the former concepts quoted above which, in our 
opinion, lack a satisfactory conceptualization (see tables A1-A6). All this results in non-conclusive 
definitions. The reasons that may account for such theoretical chaos may be attributed to the recent 
classification of Psychology as a science (Fernald, 2007; Goldfried, 2018) as well as the peculiar 
epistemological status of this discipline, dealing with subjectivity and objectivity at the same time 
(Jung, 1947; Gaj, 2016)3 or the degree of high complexity in which is involved (Staats, 1999; 
Fernald, 2007; Fanelli & Glänzel, 2013). 
 
The clinical war: conflicts between “schools of thought” 
 Scientific and clinical psychology are controversially related to each other (Meehl, 1954; 
Miller, 2001; Gaj, 2016). This contrast finds its reason in the peculiarity of the clinical context in 
which the nomothetic scientific approach conflicts with the necessary enhancement of the patient's 
                                                 
3 The objective study of subjective experience (e.g. consciousness) presents par definition epistemological difficulties 
since it compares apparently irreducible entities (objective properties measured by the scientific enquiry) with inner 
and private mental states (sometimes referred to as qualia ; states that cannot be measured and objectivised).  
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idiographic perspective. Within this controversy, the theoretical chaos in the psychotherapeutic field 
is perhaps much wider (Melchert, 2016; Goldfried, 2018). Although conciliatory efforts do exist, 
most of the psychotherapeutic concepts are used in the specific context in which they were first 
formulated and are being ignored, even mocked, by other “schools of thought” (Krantz, 1987; 
Tracy, Robins & Gosling, 2005). The definition of psychotherapeutic constructs is just as confusing.  
The same phenomenon, substantially unmodified, is “discovered” and re-named several times 
(Goldfried, 2018) [a phenomenon we propose here to label “nominomania”, a neologism we have 
coined in this regard]. Furthermore, the term “school of thought”, at least if taken literally, seems to 
be more appropriate in spiritual, political or ideological fields, not in scientific areas.  
In this regard, often unification claims, that have a long and diverse history in psychology 
(e.g. Krantz, 1987; Royce, 1987; De Groot,1990; Kimble, 1994; Anderson, 1996; 2008; Staats, 
1999; Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2001; Sternberg, 2005; Henriques, 2004, 2011; Glenberg, 2010; 
Gaj, 2016; Melchert, 2016) have been intended as a dangerous threat to scientific pluralism (e.g., 
Toulmin, 1987; Gergen, 1988; McNally,1992; Kukla, 1992 ; Kirschner, 2006). This happened, in 
our opinion, because the concept of scientific pluralism has been mistaken for the unrestrained 
proliferation of perspectives. As it has been recently proved, this uncontrolled proliferation risks 
being harmful to scientific integrity and progress (Balietti, Mäs, & Helbing, 2015).  
 
The current study  
The aim of our study has been to take a “picture” of the core-concepts of psychology and to 
consequently attest the way that they are commonly conceived and explained in introductory books, 
in order to attempt an “epistemological assessment” of the discipline.   
This has been pursued through an examination of 11 popular introductory textbooks of 
psychology published between 2012 and 2019 and the APA dictionary of psychology (VandenBos, 
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2015)4. Every concept's definition has been carefully researched along with  the introductory 
textbooks and the dictionary, and it has been reported in tables (A1-A6) along with the page it is 
presented upon, the authors and, when needed, the additional references made by the authors 
themselves. 
                 The analysis of the introductory books has been chosen because, as written by Staats 
(1999, p.5) about controversies about a unifying theory, “(...) specialists in the various fields 
consulted and used only works in that specialty. The only books that treated the several fields of 
psychology were introductory psychology texts”. In our opinion, this situation seems to be 
unchanged. Furthermore, Fanelli (2010, p.2) explicitly states that “the core [of research] is (...) 
identifiable with the content of advanced university textbooks (...)”.  
In the philosophy of science, the analysis of introductory textbooks has historically been an 
accessible tool used to roughly assess the state of a discipline (Cole, 1983, 1996, 2001). This 
analysis is extraordinarily still used today by many psychologists with either epistemological, 
educational or political aims and focuses (e.g. Roeckelein, 1996, 1997; Zechmeister & Zechmeister, 
2000; Habarth, Hansell & Grove, 2001; Simonton, 2004, 20065; Costa & Shimp., 2011; Kissee, 
Isaacson & Miller-Perrin, 2014; Griggs & Christopher, 2016; Whaley, Clay & Broussard, 2017; 
Whitehead III, Smith & Losonczy-Marshall, 2017; Ferguson, Brown, TorresBrown & Torres, 2018; 
Warne, Astle & Hill, 2018). The analysis of introductory books has also been implemented by 
scholars from other sciences, including informatics (McMaster, Rague, Sambasivam, & Wolthuis, 
2019), statistics (Ravinder & Misra, 2016; Dunn, Carey, Farrar, Richardson & McDonald, 2017), 
chemistry (Nelson, Kumar & Ramasamy, 2015), biology (Colosi, 2000; Bednekoff, 2005; Wright, 
Cardenas, Liang & Newman, 2017) and sociology (Manza  & Van Schyndel, 2000; Keith & Ender, 
                                                 
4 Someone could argue for the exclusion of influential sources, both due to their historical importance (e.g. William 
James, Wilhelm Wundt, John Watson...) or due to their specialization in specific psychological sub-disciplines  (e.g. 
Noam Chomsky, Burrhus Skinner in language studies, Jaak Panksepp and Antonio Damasio in emotion studies). 
However, such criticism would not adequately consider the organizing rationale adopted here. Our interest lies in 
what is the “core - knowledge” of contemporary psychology operationalized in popular (and recent) introductory 
textbooks.  
5  In Simonton's studies, the analysis of introductory books is just one part of a wider procedure. 
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2004; Shin, 2014).  
 
Method 
Firstly, we examined the definitions of the following fundamental terms: 
       1. psychology 
       2.  mind  
       3. behavior 
The selection of further psychological core-constructs was based on the category of  
“cognitive functions”. “Cognitive functions” are, in fact, often the main objects of study of scientific 
psychology. However, since there is no clear definition of cognition (see Table A2), we failed to 
find a specific list of cognitive functions anywhere 6. We therefore adopted the wider meaning of 
cognition, “information processing in the brain” (Zimbardo, Johnson & McCann, p.190).  
A list of cognitive functions is presented below. If their exclusive selection is no doubt somewhat 
arbitrary, all these terms are usually grouped under the umbrella-term “cognitive functions” 
(Newell, 1994, p.15; Reisberg, 2013, p.3-5; Ochsner & Kosslyn, 2013, p.7-8)7. 
        4. attention 
        5. cognition 
        6. consciousness 
        7. decision-making  
        8.  intelligence 
                                                 
6  Even when they are classified in “higher” and “lower” [the latter being more automatic and reflex-type than the 
former, requesting an “effortful” process (Frith & Dolan, 1995)], no clear list is presented.  
 
7 “Intelligence” and “language” are two atypical concepts: they cover broader phenomena than those strictly grouped 
under the label “cognitive functions”. Language is sometimes conceived as a full-fledged cognitive function (e.g. 
Newell, 1994, p. 441; Ochsner & Kosslyn, p.7) and sometimes it is not, but is nevertheless considered as strongly 
related to cognitive functioning (e.g. Reisberg, 2013, p.2). Intelligence is a wide concept, often assumed to underlie 
most cognitive process, or, more specifically, to be a sort of general “cognitive ability” (Bernstein et al., 2012, 
p.373), a varying potential of cognitive processing. Also, in this case, its close conceptual relatedness to the 
“cognitive functions” accounted for its inclusion in this list.  For conceptual clarity and exhaustiveness, we included 
also the term “cognition” itself, even if of course it is not directly cited by these authors (because it is implicitly 
assumed to be the umbrella-term under which all these concepts are grouped).  
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        9. language 
        10. learning 
        11. memory 
        12.  perception 
        13. problem solving 
        14. reasoning 
        15. thinking  
Though they are not usually considered “cognitive functions”, in the end we included the terms due 
to their importance in everyday psychology: 
      16. emotion  
      17. motivation  
      18. sensation  
Problems arising in the analysis of the specific concepts (e.g. the subdivision of memory into 
working memory, long term memory and short-term memory) have been described table by table. 
All the tables are presented in Appendix A, while a summary is included in the results section.  
          
Results  
Below are the main definitions of core concepts in psychology highlighting the main 
elements shared by authors and the texts we selected (for all details, see Appendix A). 
Psychology is literally defined by most introductory books (7/12) as the “scientific study 
of mind and behavior”.  The remaining definitions are substantially similar, despite the fact that 
“mind” is indicated through synonyms (e.g. “mental processes”, “thought”, “cognitive processes”) 
(3/12). Finally, in two definitions “mind” and “behavior” are listed along with the term “brain” or 
“brain processes”. As “mind” and “behavior” are transversely mentioned as the two pillars of 
scientific psychology, it follows that they must be the next elements to be analyzed. 
Mind is not defined by half of the introductory books. Four sources define it as a list of 
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activities (e.g. thinking, remembering, feeling...). Two bibliographic sources define it as “brain 
activity” or “brain and behavior”.  
Behavior is not defined by half of the introductory books. The other sources define it 
globally as something that can be directly observed, but it is not clear whether it is intended as 
“overt” (external actions), “covert” (internal “actions”, such as an action potential), or in both the 
meanings. Then, our analysis focused on the so-called “cognitive functions”, presented here in 
alphabetical order. 
(Selective) attention: its definitional core seems to converge on the concept of “focus of 
(restricted) cognitive resources”, but the definitions vary widely, often referring to “mental 
processes”, “conscience”, “awareness” or “perception”. Four sources do not define the 
phenomenon.  
Consciousness, along with intelligence, is one of the most debated terms in psychology. 
Definitions largely vary, but ten out of the twelve sources tautologically define consciousness as 
“awareness”, one vaguely defines it as the “the brain process that creates our mental 
representation” and finally one source does not define it. 
Cognition is so variously formulated that it is difficult to summarize its definitions. 
Broadly, cognition seems to be an “umbrella-term” under which all the activities traditionally 
considered to be “cold cognition” are grouped: e.g. information processing, thinking, reasoning, 
problem solving, understanding, knowing. Two sources consider the cognition as a mere 
synonym of “thinking” and three sources do not define it.  
Decision-making is not defined by seven sources. The remaining five sources seem to 
converge on the process of “selecting among different alternatives”, but often referring to other 
phenomenon like “cognition”, “cognitive processes” or “evaluation”. 
Intelligence is probably one of the most debated terms in the history of psychology. 
Definitions (10/12) are so rich and different that summarizing them is nearly impossible, but they 
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almost all systemically refer to other psychological constructs (e.g. reasoning, understanding, 
problem-solving...) Two sources do not define the construct.  
Language is variously defined, but almost all the definitions seem to converge on the 
manipulation of “symbols” (which are not defined) “combined” via a “set of rules” in order to 
“communicate” (“communication” is also scarcely defined). The content of the communication is 
indicated as “thoughts”, “feelings”, or “ideas”. One source does not define language. 
Learning. All the definitions seem to converge on the “modification” of “behavior”, 
“mental processes” or “information” of an individual through “experience” (which is never 
defined). 
Memory. Most of the definitions seem to converge on the “ability” (or “capacity”) to 
“acquire information8”, to “retain” it “over time” and to “retrieve” it if needed. Two sources do 
not define memory.  
Perception: All its definitions seem to converge on the “mental interpretation” (which is 
never defined) of “sensations”.  
Problem-solving is not defined by five sources. The concept of “goal” is given different 
meanings including “use of information”, “cognitive processes”, “thinking”, “behavior”, 
“reasoning”, “higher mental functions” and “active efforts”. 
Reasoning is not defined by six sources. The remaining definitions largely vary so that it is 
impossible to summarize them. What seems to emerge is a sort of “abstract” and “logical” process 
compared to problem-solving, which seems to be more pragmatic in its nature. 
Thinking is a widely used  term but in our opinion, is still vague.  Five sources largely vary 
but converge on the concept of “(mental) manipulation” of “(mental) representations” (which are 
never defined). A lot of concepts are listed along with them, such “cognitive processes”, 
“information”, “inferences”, “conclusions”, “ideas”, “images” and “scripts”. One source defines it 
                                                 
8  “information “is never defined in this case and in the following ones.  
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very vaguely as “any mental activity or processing of information”. Five remaining sources do not 
define the phenomenon. One last one merely defines it as a synonym of “cognition”. Finally, we 
focused our analysis on three terms that are very important in everyday psychology: emotion, 
motivation and sensation.  
Emotion is so variously defined that is very difficult to summarize. Some characteristics 
seem nevertheless to emerge (physical arousal, positive or negative experience, stimulus-related 
phenomenon, response behavior and cognitive appraisal), but they are so unequally considered from 
definition to definition that it is impossible to declare them as defining features. 
Motivations are variously defined. Nevertheless, the definitions seem to converge on the 
concepts of “drive” (or “influence”, “force”, “urge”, “factor”, “need”, “desire”, “disposition”, 
“impetus” or “cause”) to direct “behavior” (or “activities” or “actions”) toward a “goal” (or 
“purpose”, “needs” or “psychological wants”). It is therefore not clear if motivations are based on 
“causes”, on “purposes” or on both, but this controversy is probably more philosophical than 
psychological.  
Sensation. All its definitions seems to converge on the “stimulation” of the “sense organ” 
or “sense receptors”.  
Discussion  
As reported in all tables included in this work, the lack of consensus about the core-
constructs of psychology is ubiquitous. Analogous considerations about the unsatisfactory nature of 
definitions of constructs have already been made in sociology (Wallace, 1988). However, a coerced 
imposition of definitions would probably change nothing “unless the consensus on the meaning and 
significance of the concepts was real and natural” as written by Cole, again about sociology (1994, 
p.137).  Cole's claim probably stems from the fact that a consensus in formulating constructs cannot 
be reached if no paradigm is shared between the formulators (i.e. if they do not “filter” the world 
through the same “lenses”, resulting in a “real and natural” “consensus”). We think therefore, that a 
consensus could be reached by embracing a theoretical framework (Royce, 1987). We do not share 
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the ideas that unifying psychology is a more “disciplinal maneuver” than an “epistemological act” 
(Stam, 2004), that it can be unified albeit in a “multi-paradigmatic” way (Sternberg, 2001);  that it 
can be unified via “inter-field” and “inter-level” theories (Staats, 1991) or that it is destined never to 
be unified (Koch, 1993). In our opinion, the unification attempt might be successful as long as 
different scientists would not disagree on the “core” concepts main structures and functions.  
In this regard, we believe that the most compelling candidate to try and fix this gap is 
evolutionary psychology: it may be designed to address the demands reported above in the most 
comprehensive way.9 In fact, evolutionary psychology, in line with evolutionary biology, tries to 
answer Tinbergen's (1963) “four questions”: 1) mechanism: “What is the structure of the trait; how 
does it work?” 2) ontogeny: “How does the trait develop in individuals?”) (Nesse, 2013, p.681) 3) 
phylogeny: “What is the system’s history? How has it changed through evolution, and how does it 
differ between related species?” and 4) adaptation: “Why did the system evolve into its present 
form? What evolutionary advantages did it provide?”  (Del Giudice, 2018, p.42). The answers to the 
first two questions are usually labeled as proximate because they explain how an “organism works 
in present” (Del Giudice, 2018, p.42). The answers to the third and fourth questions are labeled as 
ultimate because they explain how an organism reached its current biological functioning from a 
“historical” perspective.  
Ultimate and proximate explanations are complementary; together, they can offer a 
satisfactory explanation about the whole functioning of psychological mechanisms. Nevertheless, 
the typical approach in medicine and psychology is to focus exclusively on the proximate ones (Del 
Giudice, 2018). Evolutionary psychology could thus be the most complete approach because it is 
the only one that manages to integrate answers to all four questions. Furthermore, it dissolves the 
long-standing debate of nature vs nurture and it is a credible bridge between scientific and clinical 
                                                 
9 Henriques (2017) claimed that “every major perspective in psychology currently accepts evolutionary theory” 
(p.393), treating it as a simple theory and not as a meta-theory, which according to him is something different and 
can be represented in his “Tree of Knowledge” (Henriques, 2003). We disagree with Henriques both in regard to the 
“acceptance” of evolutionary theory in the context of psychology and in regard to the consideration of evolutionary 
psychology as a theory, while we explicitly claim that it  is a meta-theory.  
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psychology, which manages to connect in a continuum of normal vs abnormal functioning, offering 
a compelling explanation for many mental disorders (Nesse, 2015; Brüne, 2015; Del Giudice, 
2018). Some critical points must be addressed before this issue is analyzed more thoroughly.  
First critical aspect: is it any different in the so-called “harder” sciences? 
One could argue whether this conceptual vacuum is also present in other sciences. It is 
widely accepted that the scientific inquiry is a process of constant reviewing and redefining of its 
constructs (Kuhn, 1970), so a similar situation could be evidenced in other branches of knowledge. 
However, there seem to be different degrees of “uncertainty” varying from one science to another. 
This has been defined by many as the contrast between “hard” and “soft” sciences.  
 What is meant by “hard” science? There is no univocal definition, though, the key idea is that hard 
sciences typically show a larger consensus in their “core” [the “core” is “ the corpus of agreed upon 
theories and concepts that researchers need to know in order to contribute to the field” (Fanelli, 
2010, p.2)] (Zuckerman & Merton,1972; Cole, 1983, 1994; Simonton, 2006; Fanelli, 2010; Fanelli 
& Glänzel, 2013). Furthermore, hard sciences seem to prove a stronger capacity to accumulate 
knowledge, relying more “on the significance of new knowledge and the continuing relevance of 
old’’ (Fanelli & Glanzel, 2013, p.1; Simonton, 2002).  
By contrast, soft sciences seem to have less consensus in their core, a minor capacity to 
accumulate knowledge and a minor adherence to the data and theories, who “speak less from 
themselves” and are more likely to be influenced by non-cognitive factors, such as the academic 
prestige, political and ideological beliefs, and so on  (Fanelli & Glänzel, 2013).   There is no 
qualitative difference, rather a “graduation” between these two “groups” (Fanelli & Glänzel, 2013). 
This contrast, recently seen as “controversial, if not even offensive”, nevertheless seems “to capture 
an essential feature of science” (Fanelli, 2013, p.1). 
Psychology is both historically (Simonton, 2004) and contemporarily (Fanelli, 2010; 
Fanelli & Glänzel, 2013) considered as “soft” when compared to “hard” sciences such as physics, 
biology or chemistry.  These sciences are often compared to psychology theoretically and 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
PSYCHOLOGY: A GIANT WITH FEET OF CLAY 
15 
practically (Popper, 1972; Lilienfeld, 2014); moreover, they are more frequently believed to be 
“stronger” than psychology both by lay people and by scholars (Janda, England, Lovejoy & Drury, 
1998). In order to assess if this difference in “hardness” is real, we conducted a comparison between 
the psychological science and these three sciences (physics, biology, chemistry). 
Ideally, two considerations, respectively labeled synchronic and diachronic, must be 
addressed in order to draw the comparison. First, it must be examined whether, within a specific 
time interval (often the most recent), the degree of “hardness” in physics, biology and chemistry is 
meaningfully different than the one in psychology [synchronic]. Second, it must be examined 
whether, along with the scientific progress evolving over time, the “significance of new knowledge 
and the continuing relevance of old” is really different between psychology and these other three 
sciences [diachronic].  
A synchronic point of view. The first question seems to have been answered by empirical 
literature, which, by using sophisticated bibliometric and statistical methodologies, has empirically 
demonstrated what only used to be a conceptual speculation (Simonton, 2002, 2004; Fanelli, 2010; 
Fanelli & Fanelli & Glänzel,2013).  Simonton's first paper (2002) is an attempt to summarize a 
“systematic statistical comparison” (Simonton, 2002, p.352)  of all previous research conducted in 
the “epistemological assessment” of the hierarchy of sciences, in order not to “to address the 
substantive question piecemeal” but rather to get a global reliable index. For example, different 
studies previously conducted dealt with different disciplines. Also, the “various alternative rankings 
of the sciences” had “not [been] subjected to any rigorous statistical test of the degree to which they 
might be in agreement” (Simonton, 2002, p.352). The disciplines considered in this study were 
physics, chemistry, psychology and sociology. With such a rigorous methodology, the parameters 
considered in this study have been: 
1.Theories-to-laws ratio. “ Roeckelein's (1997) measure called “theories-to-laws ratio" 
(number of cited theories divided by number of cited laws in textbooks). (…) The ratio will be well-
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balanced, i.e., show low values, for the "natural" sciences (physics, chemistry, biology) and be 
poorly balanced, i.e., show high values, for the "social" sciences (anthropology, sociology)” 
(Roeckelein, 1997, p. 131). The higher the ratio, the higher the “softness”. 
  2. Consultation rate. Suls & Fletcher (1983) index, based on Leon Festinger’s (1954) 
social comparison theory. In a nutshell, the consultation “with colleagues before submitting a paper 
for publication in the discipline’s journal (…), revealed in the acknowledgment sections of the 
published articles” (Simonton, p.351) is assumed to reflect the uncertainty about core topics of the 
discipline. “The specific measure was the number of persons acknowledged adjusted for the number 
of authors” (Simonton, 2002, p.352). Similar to the previous index, the higher the ratio, the higher 
the “softness”. 
 3. Early impact rate. All the remaining criteria came from Cole (1983). The first is the 
“proportion of scientists under 35 whose work received more than the mean number of citations for 
their field” (S. Cole, 1983, p. 118; i.e., fields that incorporate most quickly the work of young 
scientists are assumed to rank higher in the hierarchy) ” (Simonton, 2002, p.354). 
 4. Peer evaluation consensus I. The fourth criterion is supposed to evaluate consensus, i.e.  
“the “consensus on evaluating scientists by field” (S. Cole, 1983, p. 120), where 60 scientists per 
field were rated by colleagues in the same discipline (the consensus was gauged by the mean 
standard deviation of the ratings)”.  
 5. Peer evaluation consensus II. The fifth criterion is supposed to evaluate the consensus as 
well, i.e. “the consensus gauged by asking scientists to mention those who “have contributed the 
most in past two decades” (S. Cole, 1983, p. 120; the specific index is the percentage of “mentions 
received by 5 most mentioned names”).   
          6. Citation concentration. The “concentration of citations to research articles” (S. 
Cole, 1983, p. 122; using the Gini coefficient) (Simonton, 2002, p.354).“If the citations are all 
concentrated in a single article, then the disciplinary consensus must be very high, whereas if it is 
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more evenly distributed across articles, then the consensus must be minimal” (Simonton, 2002, 
p.353).  
The overall results (for further detail, see Simonton, 2002) confirmed the “soft” status of 
psychology compared to physics and chemistry.  
Simonton's second paper (2004) is aimed at replicating and expanding the former study. It 
deals specifically with physics, chemistry, biology, psychology and sociology. Two further primary 
criteria have been added to those mentioned above:  
1. The obsolescence rate by McDowell (1982). “On the basis of the relative frequency of 
citations to older publications, McDowell (1982) determined the rate at which knowledge becomes 
obsolete for the disciplines (...) The specific measure used here was his calculation of the expected 
publication cost of interrupting a career for just 1 year. (...). For example, if their career is 
interrupted for a single year (e.g., by administrative work or parental or health leave), the output of 
physicists will be cut by about 17%, whereas the productivity of psychologists will be cut by about 
10% (because physicists will have much more “catching up on the literature” to do before they can 
resuscitate their careers) (Simonton, 2004, p.61). 
2. Graph prominence: “Cleveland (1984) assessed the extent to which graphs appear in 
articles published in the professional journals, demonstrating that graphs are more extensively used 
in the “hard” disciplines (see also Smith et al., in press).” 
The peer evaluation consensus II was removed due to methodological issues. Other 
“secondary measures” are considered, even if not essential for the main statistics because they are 
not completely objective but nevertheless they are “useful for validating the results obtained from 
the primary measures”  (Simonton, 2004, p. 62)10.  The results demonstrated that Psychology is 
“softer” than the traditional “harder” sciences according to these parameters.  
Fanelli's first study (2010) focused on the “confirmatory bias”. In other words, 
                                                 
10  Lecture disfluency, Citation immediacy, Anticipation frequency, Age at receipt of Nobel Prize, rated disciplinary 
hardness (for further details, see Simonton 2004).  
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“researchers in ‘‘softer’’ sciences should have fewer constraints to their conscious and unconscious 
biases, and therefore report more positive outcome” (Fanelli, 2010, p.1). This study includes a 
broad range of sciences, including physics, chemistry, biology and psychology. The results are 
clear: “the odds of reporting a positive result were around 5 times higher among papers in the 
disciplines of Psychology and Psychiatry and Economics and Business compared to Space Science, 
2.3 times higher in the domain of social sciences compared to the physical sciences, and 3.4 times 
higher in studies applying behavioral and social methodologies on people compared to physical and 
chemical studies on non-biological material”. For further methodological issues, see the original 
paper (Fanelli, 2010).  
Fanelli & Ganzel’s paper (2013) is more sophisticated. About 30, 000 papers from different 
disciplines (including physics, chemistry, biology and psychology) have been analyzed through nine 
indexes:  
1. Number of authors. “Research teams are almost by definition built around a consensus 
on objectives and methods. Moreover, the ability to study a problem with greater accuracy and 
detail leads to a specialization of roles, making collaboration essential(...) The hardness of a field, 
therefore, should be manifest in the size of its research teams” (Fanelli & Ganzel, 2013, p.4). 
 2. Length of article. “When consensus is lower, papers must put greater efforts in 
describing the background, justify their rationale and approach, back up their claims and 
extensively discuss their findings (...) Longer introductions, and generally longer papers, should 
therefore characterize softer research. We measured the total number of pages” (Fanelli & Ganzel, 
2013, p.5). 
 3. Number of references. “For reasons similar to those that make an article longer, 
references to previous literature should also be more numerous in low-consensus fields (…)” 
 4. References to monographs. “Scholars in the humanities and social sciences still 
frequently choose to publish books rather than papers”.  
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 5. Age of references. “Having noted that some sciences ‘‘metabolize’’ the literature more 
rapidly, Derek de Solla Price (1970) proposed an index, which measures the proportion of cited 
references published in the five years preceding the citing paper. The faster the “metabolism”, the 
“harder” the science. 
 6. Diversity of sources. “When scholars agree on the relative importance of scientific 
problems, their efforts will concentrate in specific fields and their findings will be of more general 
interest, leading to a greater concentration of the relevant literature in few, high-ranking outlets” 
(Fanelli & Ganzel, 2013,  p.6). 
 7. Relative title length. “Linguistic analyses of scientific papers noted that the number of 
substantive words in titles tended to be longer and to correlate with an article’s total length in harder 
fields (...). We measured the total number of words, divided by total number of pages.”  
 8. Use of first person. “Scientists aim at making universal claims, and their style of writing 
tends to be as impersonal as possible. In the humanities, on the other hand, the emphasis tends to be 
on originality, individuality and argumentation, which makes the use of first person more 
common(...)”  
          9. Sharing of references. “Authors that cite a common literature almost by definition are 
exhibiting a common cognitive background. The sharing of references between papers, therefore, is 
perhaps the most direct expression of scholarly consensus. Of the various techniques available to 
analyse citation networks, the most likely to reflect this parameter is bibliographic coupling, in 
which a network link is draw between two papers that cite the same reference(...)” (Fanelli & 
Ganzel, 2013, p.6-7). 
Once again, the hierarchy of sciences (with psychology/psychiatry as “soft” sciences) has 
been confirmed (for more detail, see Fanelli & Ganzel, 2013). Psychology, often alongside 
psychiatry, really seems to be  “softer” than physics, chemistry and biology.  As we believe that the 
experimental method applied to philosophy is a valid tool to settle conceptual disputes (Griffiths & 
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Stotz, 2008; Sytsma & Buckwalter, 2016), we have mainly based our considerations on this 
empirical data. Reasonably, it could be argued that this empirical data  is not sufficient to 
exclusively resolve the issue.  It could be said, for example, that even the fundamental concept of 
“life” - upon which biology is based (βίος/bíos: life; λογος/logos: science) -  is indeed not 
unanimous, as said by Lilienfeld (2004) against Henriques (2004).  In our opinion, this conceptual 
claim does not take into account the broader epistemological context of biology; the latter clearly 
seeming more “solid” than the context of psychology as demonstrated by the studies mentioned 
above. Similar considerations could be made on analogous controversies in physics and chemistry. 
A diachronic point of view. The second issue is about the historical discontinuity (“the 
significance of new knowledge and the continuing relevance of old”), or as Simonton (2002, p. 355) 
put it, the “intra-disciplinary advancement”. A historical analysis in psychology is inevitably 
preceded by many conceptual problems. First, does the word “paradigm(s)” fit the “schools of 
thought” in a proper sense? The answer is largely controversial, and some authors have fairly 
proposed to use the word “sub-discipline” instead (Friman, Allen, Kerwin, & Larzelere, 1993), a 
suggestion that has been adopted by other studies in this field alongside the term “school” (Robins, 
Gosling & Craik, 1999; Tracy et al., 2005; Norcross, Karpiak & Santoro, 2005; Spear, 2007).  Here, 
we will use the word “approach”, “theory” or “trend” because the term “sub-discipline” or “school” 
might implicitly suggest that these views are completely incompatible with each other when they 
are not.  
Consistent with the considerations about the experimental method applied to conceptual 
disputes, we based our commentary only on existing empirical literature on “historical trends” in 
psychology (Robins et al., 1999; Tracy et al., 2005; Norcross et al., 2005; Spear, 2007).11 These 
studies assessed the prominence of every theory thanks to particular bibliometric measures; 
                                                 
11  Moreover, our focus has been exclusively on these studies because we wanted to avoid the systematic positive 
distortion of a researchers' point of view towards his own theory (Tracy et al., 2005). This bias could potentially affect 
all qualitative historical analysis. Furthermore, empirical analysis appears to be a more intersubjective source than 
qualitative analysis (Simonton 1990, 2006).  
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assuming the more an approach is cited the more it is prominent, they estimate the “citation pattern” 
of every theory and compare one to each other  in order to determine what “rises”, what “is in 
decline” and so on.  
This stance obviously limited12 (but also grounded) our conclusions in the period in which 
bibliometric analysis has been done, i.e., after the 1950’s. It has also restricted the analysis of just 
four approaches (psychoanalysis, cognitivism, behaviorism and neuroscience). Spear (2007) also 
considered the neuro-cognitive theory and Norcross and colleagues (2005), whose analysis was 
about clinics, also mentioned the humanistic and integrative/eclectic approaches. Cognitive-
behavioral theory, gestalt theory, evolutionary psychology, alongside other important approaches 
and historical traditions – e.g. structuralism and functionalism - have been deliberately ignored, 
making our conclusions simpler (and perhaps more simplistic). Furthermore, the approaches have 
been considered in a “monolithic fashion”, while it is widely known, for example, that 
psychoanalysis is subdivided into many different approaches.  
Despite all these limitations, since the intention was to have an overall idea about conflicts 
between different theories, we believe that such analysis may satisfactorily reach our aim. In 
summary, what emerges from these papers is that the neuro-cognitive approach is undoubtedly the 
most popular nowadays in psychology (Tracy et al., 2005; Spear, 2007). On the other hand, in 
clinical psychology, cognitive and eclectic/integrative approaches appear to be the most 
implemented (Norcross et al., 2005). Although the cognitive approach is a very common and 
shared, it seems to be far away from being a real “paradigm”. (Tracy et al., 2005; Spear, 2007). 
A historical comparison with the other sciences is therefore unlikely to be made. No real 
paradigm seems to be identifiable in the “recent” history of psychology (post-1950). It is very likely 
that no real paradigm (in a kuhnian sense) existed either in “past” psychology (1879-1950) as many 
suggested (James, 1894; Heidbreder, 1933; Cronbach, 1957).  Since no real psychological paradigm 
                                                 
12  These bibliometric indicators have been harshly criticized (Pettit, 2016; Burman, 2018). 
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(in a kuhnian sense) probably ever existed, it is very difficult to assess if the “intra-disciplinary 
advancement” is actually different between psychology and physics, chemistry and biology. One 
empirical study confirms this hypothesis which comes from Simonton's study (2002, p.355), who 
reanalyzed the theories-to-laws ratio collected by Roeckelein (1997) and showed how this ratio 
declines as the years pass in physics or chemistry, but rises in psychology, supporting its “softness”. 
Finally, addressing the question that started this section, psychology appears to be different 
from the so-called “harder” sciences. It seems to still dwell in a pre-paradigmatic stage (Kuhn, 
1970), in which conflicts between rival schools hamper the development of an original research 
programme (Lakatos, Worrall & Currie, 1979). This condition has already been “assessed” by many 
(e.g. Kuhn, 1970; Warren, 1971; Briskman, 1972; Balietti et al., 2015; Melchert, 2016; Goldfried, 
2018).  
 
 
Second critical aspect: is the empirical evidence collected over one hundred years not enough 
to declare psychology as a science?  
The current work aimed at underlining the theoretical precariousness of psychology, not at 
undermining its scientific status or at denying its important discoveries and results. It is not our 
intention to question the validity, necessity or importance of this discipline. We are not discussing 
whether or not psychology is a science. Instead, our focus is on its epistemological status and on the 
way in which it could become a paradigmatic discipline and not a pre-paradigmatic one. As we have 
a great interest in the matter, we do hope that with a clearer theoretical framework, a lot of scientific 
issues could be tackled with more success.  
 
Third critical aspect: why should evolutionary theory be more complete than others? How 
would it be adopted? 
Evolutionary psychology has a lot of criticisms. Its major tenets have been questioned, 
including its testability, some of its fundamental cognitive assumptions like the massive modularity, 
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the alleged inconsistency of the notion of EEA (environment of evolutionary adaptation), its 
potential methodological flaws (disjunction and grain problems), its alleged determinism, 
reductionism and the underestimation of the environmental influences, as well as the so-called 
“natural teleology” and the “spandrel” problem (Gould & Lewontin, 1979; Davies, Fetzer & Foster, 
1995;  Panksepp & Panksepp, 2000; Fodor, 2001; Lloyd & Feldman, 2002; Gannon, 2002; Franks, 
2005;  Buller, 2006; Richardson, 2007; Hamilton, 2008; Machery, 2008;  Rose & Rose, 2010; 
Bolhuis, Brown, Richardson, & Laland, 2011; Ward, 2012; Peters, 2013). However, many of these 
criticisms seem to be inconsistent due to theoretical misconceptions, as suggested by many 
evolutionary scholars (Buss, Haselton, Shackelford, Bleske, & Wakefield, 1998; Carruthers, 2003, 
2006; Tooby, Cosmides & Barrett, 2005; Barkow, 2005; Daly & Wilson, 2005; Hagen, 2005; 2015; 
Hagen & Hammerstein, 2005; Delton, Robertson & Kenrick, 2006; Machery & Barrett., 2006; 
Confer et al., 2010; Van Le et al., 2013; Klasios, 2014; Ploeger & van der Hoort, 2015). 
Despite the considerable empirical support collected, which can be summarized in recently 
edited handbooks of evolutionary psychology (Barrett, 2007; Buss 2015a, 2015b, 2019) and despite 
the heartfelt claims of unification under its name (e.g. Cosmides, Tooby & Barkow, 1992; Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1992;  Buss, 1995; Caporael, 2001;Tooby & Cosmides, 2007; Dunbar & Barrett 2007b, 
Duntley & Buss, 2008; Badcock, 2012; Carmen et al., 2013), this discipline is not yet a paradigm in 
the Kuhnian sense 13 (Glass, Wilson & Geher, 2012; Burke, 2014).  
We believe that evolutionary psychology may represent a compelling meta-theory. 
Nevertheless, it is more multifaceted than it is sometimes presented. This approach is indeed often 
mechanically identified with the “EP” or “Santa Barbara School” - led by John Tooby, Leda 
Cosmides, Steven Pinker, David Buss and Donald Symons - and with its own theories (Barrett et 
al., 2014). This trend is often referred to as the narrow-sense evolutionary psychologists (Mameli, 
2007)   
                                                 
13  i.e. an acknowledged and shared major theory and methodology around which minor sub-theories “orbit” (Kuhn, 
1970) 
 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
PSYCHOLOGY: A GIANT WITH FEET OF CLAY 
24 
However, within evolutionary psychology, different theories have been proposed, aligned 
to a core-idea that however results in dramatically different assumptions and implications,  a 
tendency that may referred to as the broad sense evolutionary psychology (Mameli, 2007). To 
testify this pluralism, it is worth noting that some leading evolutionary scholars question the 
computational postulation, the massive modularity hypothesis and the notion of EEA itself, 
concepts upon which the “Santa Barbara School” has been built (Dunbar & Barrett, 2007a, 2007b; 
Stephen, 2014; Barrett et al., 2014; Barrett, Pollet & Stulp, 2015; Stulp, Pollet & Barrett 2015). 
They firmly believe in the evolutionary framework, but they have a somewhat greater consideration 
of the environmental influences. For example, in a recent study, Tomasello (2019) suggested from 
an evolutionary perspective that what makes human unique is primarily related to cultural and 
ontogenetic processes. As regards for the computational criticisms, there is a growing interest in the 
e-cognition or distributed cognition (e.g. Barrett, 2011).  
Setting aside the specific controversies, what we want to highlight is that evolutionary 
psychology must not be identified as a monolithic school, rather as a core-idea (“our mind and 
behavior are significantly shaped by our phylogenetic history”) that can be variously addressed. 
What is fiercely debated concerns specific theories and methodologies: almost no-one would deny 
that we are animals biologically designed to survive and reproduce.14 Most of the critics of 
evolutionary psychology recognize that its core principle is credible (Hagen, 2015).  
However, “the contested nature of evolutionary psychology lies not in our status as evolved 
beings, but in the extent to which evolutionary ideas add value to studies of human behavior, and 
the rigor with which these ideas are tested” (Barrett, Pollet & Stulp, 2014, p. 1). Fodor (2001) 
advised in this regard that no scientific field, even if logically intriguing, could be valid a priori; the 
only legitimate criterion is the empirical evidence (a posteriori). He argues (Fodor, 2001, p.83) that 
there is no pure logical reason constraining the mind and brain to follow the same evolutionary 
                                                 
14  Such statements must be interpreted with caution: the biological design does not imply a reductionistic view 
of the mind and the main evolutionary aim (reproduction) must be intended not in an overly intuitive manner (Pinker, 
1997).  
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processes which designed the other organs of the body. Similarly, Fodor goes on, there is no 
necessary link between “lunar geography” and “cellular mitosis”, even if both can be claimed as 
scientific phenomenon. We find this argument logically consistent but pragmatically inconsistent. 
Adopting an “Occam's razor” reasoning, we object that there seems to be a far greater 
“epistemological distance” between lunar geography15and cellular mitosis than the one occurring 
between the mind-brain system and the rest of the body.  
Despite its limitations, evolutionary psychology's global theoretical consistency (which 
cannot determine its scientific success alone anyway) cannot be ignored (Wilson, 1999). It is linked 
directly to biology, through which it can be connected to the other “hard” sciences.  It is compatible 
with – and somewhat built on – neuro-cognitivism, and finally it is consistent with other 
psychological sub-disciplines (e.g. developmental, social, personality and psychopathology) and 
with other disciplines and sciences, like anthropology (Barrett, 2007; Buss 2015a, 2015b). 
A great unresolved issue stands in our way to a theoretical and practical resolution. What 
about the other “schools of thought”? What about psychoanalysis, Gestalt, systemic, humanistic 
theory and positive psychology (just to note a few...)? Can they co-exist with evolutionary 
psychology? Can they maintain their identity? If evolutionary psychology proves itself as a meta-
theory, will they be “cannibalized”16?  The matter is the most important; here probably lies the very 
nature of the problem.  
 We explain below why evolutionary psychology seems to prove itself as the most all-
encompassing approach. Historically, every psychological school posited a “drive” or a “aim” at the 
very heart of the whole psychological functioning. Melchert (2016, p. 488) labeled it as the “first 
principle”.  For Freudian psychoanalysis, this has been the fulfilment of a “drive” (Trieb, in 
Deutsch), for Jung, it was the process of individualization – and similarly, every psychodynamic 
author has its own name and related theory. The same happens in other schools of thought as well: 
                                                 
15 Upon which soil no trace of life has been found 
16 Adopting a colorful metaphor by E.O Wilson, quoted in Buss (2019, p.39) 
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systemic theory, for example, posits that an individual cannot be separated from his familiar 
context, which is in turn seeking homeostasis. Rogers, often regarded as the “father” of humanistic 
theory, stated that every individual ultimately seeks self-actualization. This is a rough and simplistic 
summary, since is not our intention to make a list of all the different “first principles” by different 
schools. What we want to stress here is that every psychological school posits universal and inborn 
tendencies in every individual, which are obviously shaped by the environment in which they 
unfold.  This first principles are universal and inborn tendencies, axioms through which all the 
theoretical and practical corollaries of the given school develop. Without the fulfilment of the drive, 
there would be no place in Freudian psychoanalysis for “higher” theories (e.g. dream interpretation, 
transference, psychosexual development, Oedipus complex, Eros and Thanatos etc.), or specific 
techniques (e.g. interpretation, confrontation, working through etc. ) Similarly, in all the other 
schools, all theory and practice is eventually related to a first principle(s), which is universal and 
inborn.   
We claim that evolutionary psychology is precisely the most compelling theoretical and 
empirical effort to frame these universal and inborn tendencies (nature). It is also the most 
compelling approach to frame the environmental influences intervening in shaping these tendencies 
(nurture). In this regard, this approach could be based on two theoretical foundations, one nested in 
each other. The first foundation (nature) seems to clearly be the process of natural selection itself, 
which poses evolutionary psychology directly in connection with evolutionary biology. The natural 
selection chooses which components are part of human (and non-human) innateness.  There are 
some controversies about the actual “unit” upon which natural selection acts, but one of the most 
popular and widely accepted theory today is the gene-centered view of evolution; commonly known 
as the “selfish gene” theory by Richard Dawkins (Dawkins, 2016). According to Dawkins (and to 
many biologists that endorse this theory) the selection process does not act on individual organisms 
or species, rather, it acts on genes. The word “gene” is so important that it must be clearly defined. 
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As explicitly stated by Dawkins, the word “gene” is used “in a special sense, tailored to evolution 
rather than embryology” (…) “A gene is defined as any portion of chromosomal material that 
potentially lasts for enough generations to serve as a unit of natural selection” (Dawkins, 2016, 
p.754). Epigenetic variations are comprehended as well, because it is demonstrated that they are 
hereditable and can be selected in the evolution process (e.g. Del Giudice, 2018). Genes are 
expressed in phenotypes, but the latter are merely genes' “vehicles”. To summarize, evolutionary 
speaking, it is almost all about genes trying to replicate themselves to become “immortal”17. 
Complex phenomena like intra-genomic conflict and inclusive-fitness theory find their natural 
explanation in the Dawkins theory 18. Of course, the gene-centered view of evolution view has been 
criticized (e.g. Gould, 1997). Furthermore, complementary and partially different explications have 
been proposed, like the multilevel selection theory (e.g. Nowak,Tarnita & Wilson, 2010) which has 
been harshly criticized by a paper signed by 137 biologists (Abbott et al., 2011). Even if the 
controversies are far from dissolving, the consensus on the gene-centered view of evolution seems 
the mainstream theory in the contemporary evolutionary biology, so we will stick with it.  
However, a naive application of the “selfish gene” theory to human mind and behavior to 
frame our “innateness” would lead us to unforgivable mistakes. Thanks to the “seed bank paradox”, 
we can easily grasp the conceptual gap between a naive application of the “selfish gene” theory in 
psychology and the actual evolutionary process that seems to be in play. For example, if the 
ultimate goal of an individual is to spread their genes, one could assume (naive application), that 
the males living in our contemporary society should feel the urge to donate their sperm to a seed 
bank in order to spread their genes at a dramatically higher rate than the one achievable through 
simple mating. Of course, this does not happen. The answer to this paradox, Steven Pinker (1997, 
p.44) wrote is that “Sexual desire is not people's strategy to propagate their genes. It's people's 
                                                 
17  Dawkins himself noted (2016, p.13) that “immortal gene” would had been probably a better title than “selfish 
gene”.  
18 These complicated processes are here only mentioned for the sake of brevity. The reader may find further details 
elsewhere (e.g. Dawkins, 2016) 
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strategy to attain the pleasures of sex, and the pleasures of sex are the genes' strategy to propagate 
themselves.” In other words, evolution selected the genes that code for sexual lust, that in turn was 
a “genes' strategy to propagate themselves”. It is the lust, and not a cumbersome psychological 
mechanism such as the “urge to donate to seed bank”19 that human beings want to experience.  A 
first important divisor must therefore be drawn between the behaviors' “aim” and genes' “aim”.20  
Behaviors are shaped by genes' “perspective”21, but they cannot completely be reduced to them. 
Here, the second foundation of evolutionary psychology is relevant; what makes our human mind 
and behavior unique (Tomasello, 1999, 2019). What shaped the human specific psychology in our 
environment of evolutionary adaptation? The social brain hypothesis, popularized by the British 
scholar Robin Dunbar (1998, 2009) seems to successfully answer this question. Along with other 
fundamental adaptations (e.g. problems of survival, problems of sex and mating and problems of 
parenting and kinship), our Homo Sapiens species seems to distinguish itself due to the importance 
that the social environment has as a selective pressure to shape our psychological functioning 
(Dunbar 1998, 2009).22 We are, in Tomasello's words (2014), an “ultra-social” animal, the most 
socially competent species on the planet. We can co-operate in complex ways, “read” other 
“intentions” (what is often called as “theory of mind”), communicate through a public language, 
share our attention, etcetera (Tomasello, 1999, 2009).  What is crucial here is that our social 
competence is ultimately permitted by our biological functioning. In a nutshell, we are naturally 
selected to be cultural. At the same time, our cultural life has a biological impact on us; we are 
culturally shaped in our nature.   
This evolutionary explanation seems to make sense to our extraordinary sensitivity to social 
                                                 
19 The “seed bank” is a very recent cultural introduction and could not be targeted by the genes in so little evolutionary 
period to develop a psychological mechanism.  
20 The word “aim” is used in a deliberately metaphorically fashion, we do not imply teleology for genes. 
21 It is absolutely necessary to stress the fact that we are adopting again metaphorical language. Genes actually do not 
“reason”, “plan” or “make strategies”, but we could easily grasp conceptually their “behavior” through these 
mentalistic metaphors.  
22 Of course mating, parenting and kinship are social processes themselves, but they are more common in the animal 
kingdom than the specific Homo Sapiens' social competence, which seems to have being triggered by group living. 
It is likely that this competence has influenced the process of mating, parenting and kinship, according to a circular 
causality process.  
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signals and to our vulnerability to mental disorders, which characterize themselves very often as an 
impairment in “social participation” (APA, 2013).  
All that being said, evolutionary psychology really seems to prove itself as a compelling 
meta-theory. It fully accounts both for our innate and universal nature and for the crucial role of our 
social environment. It can explain both our universal nature and our personal individuality, because 
it accounts for our high plasticity to our environment, since we are biologically “wired” to collect 
environmental signals (which in turn can influence our biology). Eventually, it explains why we are 
so vulnerable to mental disorders. The study of the power of the gene-relatedness in our behavior is 
now largely attested (e.g. Buss, 2019). More importantly, the “innateness” of evolutionary 
psychology is biologically and empirically based, it is not drawn from speculation or from clinical 
observations.  At the same time, the social brain hypothesis is in harmony with the clinical 
observations made by systemic, Gestaltic, and intersubjective schools (just to note a few...). It 
furthermore explains, along with other complex psychological mechanisms (e.g. Del Giudice, 2018) 
our abnormal functioning.23. In another words, evolutionary psychology really seems to be the most 
complete and multifaceted approach to comprehend human (and non-human) psychological 
functioning.  
Conclusion  
An analysis of “core-concepts” in psychology (showing unsatisfactory and discordant 
definitions) and a comparison to “harder” sciences (physics, physics, chemistry and biology) 
appeared to demonstrate the “soft” nature of psychology and its pre-paradigmatic condition. 
Evolutionary psychology has been suggested to be the most compelling candidate to possibly 
overcome this epistemological impasse. 
Obviously, there are many limitations to the considerations we proposed here. First, the 
empirical papers on which we have based our epistemological comparison are not numerous, and 
                                                 
23 Finally, integrative attempts have been made with psychoanalysis as well  (e.g. Nesse, 1990; Walters, 1994; Migon e 
& Liotti, 1998; Marcaggi & Guénolé, 2018) 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
PSYCHOLOGY: A GIANT WITH FEET OF CLAY 
30 
they should be replicated in more recent times (especially the papers about the “historical trends” in 
psychology, which also considered the schools in a “monolithic fashion”). Furthermore, someone 
could more generally question the empirical validity of these analyses from a methodological point 
of view.  In addition, the selection of the sample of introductory books and the “core-constructs” 
could be questioned as somewhat arbitrary. Finally, the claim of unification under the name of 
evolutionary could be seen as ideological.  
Nonetheless, we believe that our conclusions and main arguments remain robust. Even if 
the “empirical” papers about conceptual issues are not so numerous, we do believe that they are 
persuasive enough. This does by any means intend to devalue the theoretical reasoning per se, 
rather, rooting theory on an empirical ground. In other respects, despite its limitations, the analysis 
of introductory textbooks seems to capture an intuitive “picture” of the “core” of a science, and the 
constructs we have analyzed could be easily seen as “pillars” of psychology by many researchers. 
Furthermore, it would be impossible to conduct an analysis on an uncontroversial list of constructs, 
because, according to our knowledge, such a list simply does not exist. Finally, the motives we have 
brought into discussion to “elect” evolutionary psychology as the most compelling metatheory are 
reasonable, nor totaling or orthodox.  
The theoretical chaos affecting psychology is not news (James, 1894; Heidbreder, 1933; 
Cronbach, 1957; Miller, 1985), however, most unification claims have been made in an 
argumentative fashion and have focused on methodological, philosophical and conceptual issues. 
On the other hand, many studies have been conducted to prove that psychology is more chaotic and 
“softer” than other sciences, or to assess the prominence of its “school of thoughts”. None of these 
studies, however, have directly made a claim in the unification issue. This article wants to be a 
bridge between these two respectful “traditions” to make a theoretical claim on an empirical 
ground. 
Overcoming a pre-paradigmatic condition with the aid of evolutionary psychology is in 
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our opinion, a reachable and desirable aim. An evolutionary psychological approach must not be 
intended as a monolithic theory but as a comprehensive and conciliatory approach, not excluding 
empirical findings of other theories. This would not mean an indiscriminate gathering of all the 
theories, rather a coherent yet comprehensive application of the evolutionary principles in 
psychology. Finally, we believe that theoretical coherence and consistency can be pursued without 
orthodox tendencies. 
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Appendix A - TABLES  
TABLE A1. Definitions of psychology, mind & behavior 
 
Authors Psychology is the 
scientific study of 
Mind is Behavior is / refers to 
Bernstein et Penner, 
Clarke-Stewart & 
Roy 2012 
 
Psychology, 9th 
edition 
 
Mind and behavior 
p.4.  
X X 
Cacioppo & Freberg., 
2013  
 
Discovering 
psychology: The 
science of mind 
Mind and behavior 
p.5   
The brain and its 
activities, including 
thought, emotion, 
and behaviour.  
p.5   
 
any action that we can 
observe  
p.5 
Ciccarelli & White,  
2018 
 
Psychology 
 
Mind and behavior 
p.44  
all the internal, 
covert (hidden) 
activity such as 
thinking, feeling, 
and remembering 
p.44  
all of our outward or overt 
actions and reactions, such 
as talking, facial 
expressions, and 
movement  
p.44 
Feist & Rosenberg, 
2012 
 
Psychology: 
Perspectives and 
Connections. 
 
thought and 
behavior  
p.5  
Brain and 
behaviour 
p.5  
X 
Grison, Heatherton & 
Gazzaniga, 2017  
 
Psychology in your 
life 
 
Mind and behavior  
p.5  
X all of our actions that result 
from sensing and 
interpreting information  
p.5 
Hockenbury, Nolan 
& Hockenbury, 2015  
 
Psychology (7th ed.) 
 
Mind and behavior 
and brain processes 
p.2 
X X 
Lilienfeld, Lynn, 
Namy & Woolf, 2014 
 
Psychology: From 
inquiry to 
mind, brain, and 
behavior 
p.35 
X X 
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understanding (3rd 
ed.)  
 
Myers & DeWall, 
2015 
Psychology (11th ed.) 
Mental processes 
and behavior  
p.5  
internal, subjective 
experiences we 
infer from 
behavior—
sensations, 
perceptions, 
dreams, thoughts, 
beliefs, and 
feelings.  
p.5 
anything an organism 
does—any action we can 
observe and record  
p.5 
Schacter, Gilbert, 
Wegner & Nock, 
2014 
Psychology (3rd ed.) 
 
 
mind and behavior 
p.2  
the private inner 
experience of 
perceptions, 
thoughts, 
memories, and 
feelings 
p.2  
 
observable actions of 
human beings and 
nonhuman animals 
p.2  
 VandenBos, 2015  
 
APA dictionary of 
psychology, second 
edition 
 
the mind and 
behavior 
p. 860 
broadly, all 
intellectual and 
psychological 
phenomena of an 
organism, 
encompassing 
motivational, 
affective, 
behavioral, 
perceptual, and 
cognitive systems; 
that is, the 
organized totality of 
an organism’s 
mental and psychic 
processes and the 
structural and 
functional cognitive 
components on 
which they depend. 
(…) 
p.654 
an organism’s activities in 
response to external or 
internal stimuli  
p.112 
Weiten, 2013 
 
Psychology: Themes 
and variations, 9th 
edition 
 
behavior and the 
physiological and 
cognitive processes 
that underlie it 
p.2 
X X 
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Zimbardo, Johnson & 
McCann, 2017  
 
Psychology: Core 
concepts (8th ed.) 
behavior and mental 
processes.  
p.2 
X X 
 
Note:  
1. sign X when the definition has been found missing 
2. in some tables, definitions have logic inconsistency. These inconsistencies (i.e. tautologies 
or equivalences) are explained and highlighted in grey 
3. when the original formulators have been explicitly cited by the authors, they have been 
mentioned in the box and in the references 
4. specific comments have been made in italics (e.g. subdivision of memory in long term 
memory and short-term memory, etc.) 
5. the pages on which the definitions are presented are listed below the definitions.  
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TABLE A2. Definitions of attention, consciousness & cognition  
 
Authors  (selective) Attention  Consciousness  Cognition 
Bernstein et al., 2012 
 
Psychology, 9th 
edition 
The process of 
directing and focusing 
psychological 
resources to enhance 
perception, 
performance, and 
mental experience 
p.184 
Tautological: 
Awareness of external 
stimuli and one’s own 
mental activity.  
(Metzinger, 2000; 
Zeman, 2001)  
p.331 
X 
Cacioppo & Freberg, 
2013  
 
 
Discovering 
psychology: The 
science of mind 
X Tautological:  
A state of awareness.  
 p.236 
Internal mental 
processes including 
information processing, 
thinking, reasoning, and 
problem solving.  
p.454 
Ciccarelli & White,  
2018  
 
Psychology 
X Tautological: a 
person’s awareness of 
everything that is 
going on around him 
or her at any given 
time.(Farthing, 1992) 
 
p.178 
Considered as equal to 
thinking 
mental activity that 
goes on in the brain 
when a person is 
organizing and 
attempting to 
understand information 
and communicating 
information to others.  
p.306  
Feist & Rosenberg, 
2012 
 
Psychology: 
Perspectives and 
Connections. 
the limited capacty to 
process information 
that is under conscious 
control.  
(Styles, 2006)  
p.230 
Tautological:  an 
awareness of one’s 
surround- ings and of 
what’s in one’s mind 
at a given moment; 
includes aspects of 
being awake and 
aware. 
p.226 
mental processes 
involved in acquiring, 
processing, and storing 
knowledge.  
p.364 
Grison et al., 2017  
 
Psychology in your 
life 
X  Tautological: The 
combination of a 
person’s subjective 
experience of the 
external world and the 
person’s mental 
activity; this 
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combination results 
from brain activity.  
p.79 
Hockenbury et al., 
2015  
 
Psychology (7th ed.) 
 
the capacity to 
selectively focus 
senses and awareness 
on particular stimuli 
or aspects of the 
environment (Chun, 
Golomb & Turk 
Brown, 2011; Posner 
& Rothbart, 2007) 
p.135 
Tautological:  
Personal awareness 
of mental activities, 
internal sensations, 
and the external 
environment 
p.135 
mental activities 
involved in acquiring, 
retaining, and using 
knowledge 
p.273 
Lilienfeld et al., 2014  
  
Psychology: From 
inquiry to 
understanding (3rd 
ed.) 
X Tautological: 
our subjective 
experience of the 
world, our bodies, and 
our mental 
perspectives 
p. 200 
Considered as equal to 
thinking  
the term psychologists 
use to describe the 
mental processes 
involved in different 
aspects of thinking 
p.61 
Myers & DeWall, 
2015 
 
Psychology (11th 
ed.) 
 the focusing of 
conscious awareness 
on a particular 
stimulus. p.96 
X  all the mental activities 
associated with 
thinking, knowing, 
remembering, and 
communicating.  
p.357 
Schacter et al., 2014 
 
Psychology (3rd ed.) 
perceiving only what’s 
currently relevant to 
you 
p.135 
Tautological: 
A person’s subjective 
experience of the 
world and the mind.  
p.178 
 
X 
VandenBos, 2015 
 
APA dictionary of 
psychology, second 
edition 
 a state in which 
cognitive resources 
are fo cused on certain 
aspects of the 
environment rather 
than on others and the 
central nervous system 
is in a state of 
readiness to respond 
to stimuli.  
p.87  
Tautological: 1. the 
state of being 
conscious. 2. an 
organism’s awareness 
of something either 
internal or external to 
itself. 
p.236 
all forms of knowing 
and awareness, such as 
perceiving, conceiving, 
remembering, 
reasoning, judging, 
imagining, and problem 
solving. 
p.201 
Weiten, 2013  focusing awareness on Tautological: is the refers to the mental 
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Psychology: Themes 
and variations, 9th 
edition 
a narrowed range of 
stimuli or events.  
p.275 
awareness of internal 
and external stimuli. 
p.184 
processes involved in 
acquiring knowledge 
p.14 
// 
refers broadly to mental 
processes or thinking   
p.314 
Zimbardo et al., 2017  
 
Psychology: Core 
concepts (8th ed.) 
a feature that makes 
one item stand out 
among others in 
consciousness  
p.290 
 The brain process 
that creates our mental 
representation of the 
world and our current 
thoughts. 
p.289 
 
information processing 
in the brain  
p.190 
 
Note:  
1. sign X when the definition has been found missing 
2. in some tables, definitions have logic inconsistency. These inconsistencies (i.e. tautologies or 
equivalences) are explained and highlighted in grey 
3. when the original formulators have been explicitly cited by the authors, they have been 
mentioned in the box and in the references 
4. specific comments have been made in italics (e.g. subdivision of memory in long term memory 
and short-term memory, etc.) 
5. the pages on which the definitions are presented are listed below the definitions.  
 
Attention is as multifaceted construct rather than a single concept. Many components have been 
proposed: selective attention (subdivided in feature-based, object-based, space-based), sustained 
attention, executive attention... In order not to broaden uncontrollably, our analysis focused on the 
concept of selective attention alone. 
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TABLE A3. Definitions of decision-making, intelligence & language  
 
Authors  Decision-making Intelligence  Language  
Bernstein et al., 2012 
 Psychology, 9th 
edition 
X 
cognitive ability: 
the capacity to reason, 
remember, 
understand, solve 
problems, and make 
decisions  
p.373 
// 
Personal attributes 
that center around 
skill at information 
processing, problem 
solving, and adapting 
to new or changing 
environments 
p.374 
Symbols and a set of 
rules for combining 
them that provide a 
vehicle for 
communication.  
p.315 
Cacioppo & Freberg, 
2013  
 
 
Discovering 
psychology: The 
science of mind 
X 
The ability to 
understand complex 
ideas, adapt 
effectively to the 
environment, learn 
from experience, 
engage in reasoning, 
and overcome 
obstacles. (Neisser et 
al., 1996, p. 77) 
p.489 
 
A system for 
communicating 
thoughts and feelings 
using arbitrary signals.  
p.478  
Ciccarelli & White,  
2018  
 
Psychology 
process of cognition 
that involves 
identifying, 
evaluating, and 
choosing among 
several alternatives.  
p.311 
The ability to learn 
from one’s 
experiences, acquire 
knowledge, and use 
resources effectively 
in adapting to new 
situations or solving 
prob- lems (Sternberg 
& Kaufman, 1998; 
Wechsler, 1975)  
p.311 
a system for combining 
symbols (such as 
words) so that an 
unlimited num- ber of 
meaningful statements 
can be made for the 
purpose of 
communicating with 
others.  
p.338 
 
Feist & Rosenberg, 
2012 
X 
a set of cognitive 
skills that includes 
a communication 
system specific to 
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Psychology: 
Perspectives and 
Connections. 
abstract thinking, 
reasoning, problem 
solving, and the 
ability to acquire 
knowledge.  
p.387 
 
Homo sapiens; it is 
open and symbolic, has 
rules of grammar, and 
allows its users to 
express abstract and 
distant ideas.  
(Bickerton, 1995)  
p.349 
Grison et al., 2017  
 
Psychology in your 
life 
attempting to select 
the best alternative 
among several 
options.  
p.278  
The ability to use 
knowledge to reason, 
make decisions, make 
sense of events, solve 
problems, understand 
complex ideas, learn 
quickly, and adapt to 
environmental 
challenges  
p.287 
 
X 
Hockenbury et al., 
2015  
 
Psychology (7th ed.) 
  
X 
the global capacity to 
think rationally, act 
purposefully, and deal 
effectively with the 
environment  
(Wechsler, 1944, 
1977) 
p.290  
 
A system for 
combining arbitrary 
symbols to produce an 
infinite number of 
meaningful statements.  
p.284 
Lilienfeld et al., 2014  
 
Psychology: From 
inquiry to 
understanding (3rd 
ed.) 
the process of 
selecting among a set 
of possible 
alternatives  
p. 325 
 
X 
largely arbitrary system 
of communication that 
combines symbols 
(such as words and 
gestural signs) in rule-
based ways to create 
meaning  
p.330 
 
Myers & DeWall, 
2015 
 
Psychology (11th 
ed.) 
X 
the mental potential to 
learn from experience, 
solve problems, and 
use knowledge to 
adapt to new 
situations. 
p.386 
our spoken, written, or 
signed words and the 
ways we combine them 
to communicate 
meaning.  
p.370 
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Schacter et al., 2014 
 
Psychology (3rd ed.) 
X 
the ability to direct 
one’s thinking, adapt 
to one’s 
circumstances, and 
learn from one’s 
experiences  
(Gottfredson, 1997)  
 p.396 
 
a system for 
communicating with 
others using signals 
that are combined 
according to rules of 
grammar and convey 
meaning.  
p.352 
VandenBos, 2015 
  
APA dictionary of 
psychology, second 
edition 
the cognitive process 
of choosing between 
two or more 
alternatives, ranging 
from the relatively 
clear cut (e.g., 
ordering a meal at a 
restaurant) to the 
complex (e.g., 
selecting a mate). 
p.286 
the ability to derive 
information, learn 
from experience, 
adapt to the 
environment, 
understand, and 
correctly utilize 
thought and reason.  
p.548  
system for expressing 
or communicating 
thoughts and feelings 
through speech sounds 
or written symbols. 
p.585 
Weiten, 2013  
 
Psychology: Themes 
and variations, 9th 
edition 
evaluating alternatives 
and making choices 
among them.  
p.333 
X 
consists of symbols 
that convey mean- ing, 
plus rules for 
combining those 
symbols, that can be 
used to generate an 
infinite variety of 
messages 
p.314 
Zimbardo et al., 2017  
Psychology: Core 
concepts (8th ed.) 
X 
is the mental capacity 
to acquire knowledge, 
reason, and solve 
problems effecively  
p.207 
 
our ability to 
communicate through 
spoken and written 
words and gesture  
p.245 
 
Note:  
1. sign X when the definition has been found missing 
2. in some tables, definitions have logic inconsistency. These inconsistencies (i.e. tautologies or 
equivalences) are explained and highlighted in grey 
3. when the original formulators have been explicitly cited by the authors, they have been 
mentioned in the box and in the references 
4. specific comments have been made in italics (e.g. subdivision of memory in long term memory 
and short-term memory, etc.) 
5. the pages on which the definitions are presented are listed below the definitions.  
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TABLE A4 Definitions of learning, memory & perception  
Authors  Learning Memory  Perception  
Bernstein et al., 
2012 
 
Psychology, 9th 
edition 
The modification 
through experience of 
preexisting behavior 
and understanding 
p.197 
X The process through 
which sensations are 
interpreted, using 
knowledge and 
understanding of the 
world, so that they 
become meaningful 
experiences.  
p.157 
Cacioppo & Freberg, 
2013  
 
 
Discovering 
psychology: The 
science of mind 
 
A relatively permanent 
change in behavior or 
the capacity for 
behavior due to 
experience. 
p.350 
The ability to retain 
knowledge.  
p.399  
The process of 
interpreting sensory 
information.  
p.181 
 
Ciccarelli & White,  
2018  
  
Psychology 
any relatively 
permanent change in 
behavior brought 
about by experience or 
practice.  
p.218 
an active system that 
receives information 
from the senses, puts 
that information into a 
usable form, and 
organizes it as it stores 
it away, and then 
retrieves the 
information from 
storage. 
(adapted from 
Baddeley, 1996, 
2003).  
 p.264 
the method by which 
the sensations 
experienced at any 
given moment are 
interpreted and 
organized in some 
meaningful fashion.  
p.160  
 
Feist & Rosenberg, 
2012 
Psychology: 
Perspectives and 
Connections. 
enduring changes in 
behavior that occur 
with experience.  
p.306 
 
the ability to store and 
use information.  
p.270 
 
the act of organizing 
and interpreting 
sensory experience  
p.125 
Grison et al., 2017  
 
Psychology in your 
life 
a change in behavior, 
resulting from 
experience.  
p.197 
The nervous system’s 
capacity to acquire 
and retain skills and 
knowledge for later 
 The processing, 
organization, and 
interpretation of 
sensory signals in the 
brain; these processes 
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 retrieval.  
p.233  
result in an internal 
neural representation of 
the physical stimulus. 
p.157 
Hockenbury et al., 
2015  
Psychology (7th ed.) 
A process that 
produces a relatively 
enduring change in 
behavior or 
knowledge as a result 
of past experience.  
p.183 
refers to the mental 
processes that enable 
us to acquire, retain, 
and retrieve 
information.  
p.228 
 
The process of 
integrating, organizing, 
and interpreting 
sensations.  
p.86  
 
Lilienfeld et al., 
2014  
 
Psychology: From 
inquiry to 
understanding (3rd 
ed.) 
change in an 
organism’s behavior 
or thought as a result 
of experience  
p. 236  
retention of 
information over time  
p.276  
The brain’s 
interpretation of raw 
sensory inputs  
p.156  
 
Myers & DeWall, 
2015 
 
Psychology (11th 
ed.) 
 
the process of 
acquiring through 
experience new 
information or 
behaviors. 
p.280 
The persistence of 
learning over time 
through the encoding, 
storage, and retrieval 
of information.  
p.318  
 
the process of 
organizing and 
interpreting sensory 
information, enabling 
us to recognize 
meaningful objects and 
events.  
p.230 
Schacter et al., 2014 
  
Psychology (3rd ed.) 
involves the 
acquisition of new 
knowledge, skills, or 
responses from 
experience that results 
in a relatively 
permanent change in 
the state of the learner  
p.266 
The ability to store 
and retrieve 
information over time.  
p.222  
 
The organization, 
identification and 
interpretation of a 
sensation in order to 
form a mental 
representation.  
p.130 
VandenBos, 2015 
  
APA dictionary of 
psychology, second 
edition 
the acquisition of 
novel information, 
behaviors, or abilities 
after practice, 
observation, or other 
experiences, as 
evidenced by change 
in behavior, 
knowledge, or brain 
function  
the ability to retain 
information or a 
representation of past 
experience, based on 
the mental processes 
of learning or 
encoding, retention 
across some interval 
of time, and retrieval 
or reactivation of the 
memory. 
 the process or result of 
becoming aware of 
objects, relationships, 
and events by means of 
the senses, which 
includes such activities 
as recognizing, 
observing, and 
discriminating. These 
activities enable 
organisms to organize 
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 p. 594 p.636  and interpret the 
stimuli received into 
meaningful knowledge 
and to act in a 
coordinated manner. 
p.775  
Weiten, 2013  
  
Psychology: Themes 
and variations, 9th 
edition 
is any relatively 
durable change in 
behavior or 
knowledge that is due 
to experience  
p.230 
X 
is the selection, 
organization, and 
interpretation of 
sensory input  
p. 130  
Zimbardo et al., 
2017  
 
Psychology: Core 
concepts (8th ed.) 
a process through 
which experience 
produces a lasting 
change in behavior or 
mental processes  
p.118  
 
Human memory is an 
information 
processing system that 
works constructively 
to encode, store, and 
retrieve information.  
p.154 
.  
mental process that 
elaborates and assigns 
meaning to the 
incoming sensory 
patterns  
p.76 
 
Note:  
1. sign X when the definition has been found missing 
2. in some tables, definitions have logic inconsistency. These inconsistencies (i.e. tautologies or 
equivalences) are explained and highlighted in grey 
3. when the original formulators have been explicitly cited by the authors, they have been 
mentioned in the box and in the references 
4. specific comments have been made below in italics (e.g. subdivision of memory in long term 
memory and short-term memory, etc.) 
5. the pages on which the definitions are presented are listed below the definitions.  
 
Like attention, memory is a multifaceted phenomenon rather than a single concept. Sensorial 
memory, working memory, short-term memory, long term memory (divided in episodic, semantic, 
explicit or implicit memory), are all dimensions currently studied. In order not to broaden 
excessively our analysis our focus has been on the general definition of the term.  
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TABLE A5. Definitions of problem-solving, reasoning & sensation  
 
Authors  Problem-solving Reasoning  Thinking  
Bernstein et al., 2012 
  
Psychology, 9th 
edition 
 X The process by which 
people generate and 
evaluate arguments 
and reach conclusions 
about them 
p.295 
The manipulation of 
mental representations 
p.287 
Cacioppo & Freberg, 
2013  
 
 
Discovering 
psychology: The 
science of mind 
The use of 
information to meet a 
specific goal.  
(Lovett, 2002)  
p.462  
 
 X X 
 
Ciccarelli & White,  
2018  
 
Psychology 
process of cognition 
that occurs when a 
goal must be reached 
by thinking and 
behaving in certain 
ways.  
p.311 
 
 X considered as equal to 
cognition  
mental activity that 
goes on in the brain 
when a person is 
organizing and 
attempting to 
understand information 
and communicating 
information to others.  
p.306  
Feist & Rosenberg, 
2012 
 
Psychology: 
Perspectives and 
Connections. 
X the process of drawing 
inferences or 
conclusions from 
principles and 
evidence.  
(Sternberg, 2006)  
p.368 
X 
Grison et al., 2017  
 
Psychology in your 
life 
Finding a way around 
an obstacle to reach a 
goal.  
p.278 
 
Using information to 
determine if a 
conclusion is valid or 
reasonable.  
p. 277 
The mental 
manipulation of 
representations of 
information we 
encounter in our 
environments 
p.271 
 
Hockenbury et al., Thinking and behavior  X The manipulation of 
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2015  
Psychology (7th ed.) 
directed toward 
attaining a goal that is 
not readily available.  
(Novick & Bassok, 
2005)  
p.277 
 
mental representations 
of information in order 
to draw inferences and 
conclusions.  
p.273 
 
Lilienfeld et al., 
2014  
 
Psychology: From 
inquiry to 
understanding (3rd 
ed.) 
generating a cognitive 
strategy to accomplish 
a goal  
p. 326 
 X any mental activity or 
processing of 
information, including 
learning, remembering, 
perceiving, 
communicating, 
believing, and deciding 
p. 320  
 
Myers & DeWall, 
2015 
 
Psychology (11th 
ed.) 
X  X X 
 
Schacter et al., 2014 
  
Psychology (3rd ed.) 
X mental activity that 
consists of organizing 
information or beliefs 
into a series of steps 
in order to reach 
conclusions.  
p.388 
 
X 
VandenBos, 2015 
 
APA dictionary of 
psychology, second 
edition 
the process by which 
individuals attempt to 
overcome difficulties, 
achieve plans that 
move them from a 
starting situation to a 
desired goal, or reach 
conclusions through 
the use of higher 
mental functions, such 
as reasoning and 
creative thinking 
p.837, 838 
thinking in which 
logical processes of an 
inductive or deductive 
character are used to 
draw conclusions 
from facts or 
premises.   
p.886  
cognitive behavior in 
which ideas, images, 
mental representations, 
or other hypothetical 
elements of thought are 
experienced or 
manipulated.  
p.1084 
 
Weiten, 2013  
 
Psychology: Themes 
 
active efforts to 
discover what must be 
 X X 
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and variations, 9th 
edition 
done to achieve a goal 
that is not readily 
attainable.  
p.324  
 
Zimbardo et al., 
2017  
 
Psychology: Core 
concepts (8th ed.) 
X the ability to compare 
and evaluate 
contradictory view- 
points (Baltes & 
Staudinger, 1993; 
King & Kitchener, 
1994)  
p.275 
 
Thinking is a cognitive 
process in which the 
brain uses information 
from the senses, 
emotions, and memory 
to create and 
manipulate mental 
representations, such as 
concepts, images, 
schemas, and scripts.  
p.190  
 
 
 
Note:  
1. sign X when the definition has been found missing 
2. in some tables, definitions have logic inconsistency. These inconsistencies (i.e. tautologies or 
equivalences) are explained and highlighted in grey 
3. when the original formulators have been explicitly cited by the authors, they have been 
mentioned in the box and in the references 
4. specific comments have been made in italics (e.g. subdivision of memory in long term memory 
and short-term memory, etc.) 
5. the pages on which the definitions are presented are listed below the definitions.  
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TABLE A5 Definitions of thinking, emotion & motivation 
 
Authors  Emotion Motivation  Sensation 
Bernstein et al., 2012 
  
Psychology, 9th 
edition 
Transitory positive or 
negative experiences 
that are felt as 
happening to the self, 
are generated in part 
by cognitive appraisal 
of a situation, and are 
accompanied by both 
learned and innate 
physical responses. 
p.446  
The factors that 
influence the 
initiation, direction, 
intensity, and 
persistence of 
behavior (Reeve, 
1996)  
p.413  
 
Messages from the 
senses that make up 
the raw information 
that affects many kinds 
of behavior and mental 
processes 
p.109  
Cacioppo & Freberg, 
2013  
 
 
Discovering 
psychology: The 
science of mind 
A combination of 
arousal, physical 
sensations, and 
subjective feelings 
that occurs 
spontaneously in 
response to 
environmental stimuli. 
p.288   
A process that 
arouses, maintains, 
and guides behavior 
toward a goal. 
p.289  
 
The process of 
detecting 
environmental stimuli 
or stimuli arising from 
the body.  
p.181 
Ciccarelli & White,  
2018  
 
Psychology 
the “feeling” aspect of 
consciousness, 
characterized by a 
certain physical 
arousal, a certain 
behavior that reveals 
the emotion to the 
outside world, and an 
inner awareness of 
feelings.  
p.413  
 
the process by which 
activities are started, 
directed, and 
continued so that 
physical or 
psychological needs 
or wants are met.  
(Petri, 1996)  
p.396 
 
the process that occurs 
when special receptors 
in the sense organs are 
activated, allowing 
various forms of 
outside stimuli to 
become neural signals 
in the brain.  
p.134 
Feist & Rosenberg, 
2012 
 
Psychology: 
Perspectives and 
Connections. 
brief, acute changes in 
conscious experience 
and physiology that 
occur in response to a 
personally meaningful 
situation.  
p.449 
the urge to move 
toward one’s goals 
p.426 
The stimulation of our 
sense organs by the 
outer world  
p.124  
Grison et al., 2017  
 
Psychology in your 
 
Feelings that involve 
 
Factors of differing 
The sense organs’ 
detection of external 
physical stimulus and 
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life physical responses, 
changes in thoughts 
and in actions, and 
personal evaluation.  
p.324  
 
strength that energize, 
direct, and sustain 
behavior.  
p.309  
the transmission of 
information about this 
stimulus to the brain. 
p.157   
Hockenbury et al., 
2015  
Psychology (7th ed.) 
A complex 
psychological state 
that involves a 
subjective experience, 
a physiological 
response, and a 
behavioral or 
expressive response.  
p.330  
The biological, 
emotional, cognitive, 
or social forces that 
activate and direct 
behavior. 
p.314 
The process of 
detecting a physical 
stimulus, such as light, 
sound, heat, or 
pressure.  
p.86 
Lilienfeld et al., 2014  
 
Psychology: From 
inquiry to 
understanding (3rd 
ed.) 
mental state or feeling 
associated with our 
evaluation of our 
experiences  
p.442 
 
psychological drives 
that propel us in a 
specific direction  
p.465 
detection of physical 
energy by sense 
organs, which then 
send information to the 
brain 
p.156  
Myers & DeWall, 
2015 
 
Psychology (11th ed.) 
a response of the 
whole organism, 
involving (1) 
physiological arousal, 
(2) expressive 
behaviors, and (3) 
conscious experience. 
p.461 
a need or desire that 
energizes and directs 
behavior.  
p.420 
 
the process by which 
our sensory receptors 
and nervous system 
receive and represent 
stimulus energies from 
our environment.  
p.230 
Schacter et al., 2014 
  
Psychology (3rd ed.) 
positive or negative 
experience that is 
associated with a 
particular pattern of 
physiological activity.  
 
p.316 
 
the purpose for or 
psychological cause 
of an action  
p.330 
 
disposition, impetus, 
cause - purpose 
simple stimulation of a 
sense organ  
p.130  
 
VandenBos, 2015 
 
APA dictionary of 
psychology, second 
edition 
complex reaction 
pattern, involving 
experiential, 
behavioral, and 
physiological 
elements, by which an 
individual attempts to 
deal with a personally 
the impetus that gives 
purpose or direction to 
behavior and operates 
in humans at a 
conscious or 
unconscious level  
 
the process or 
experience of 
perceiving through the 
senses.  
p.962 
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significant matter or 
event.  
 
p.362 
p.670 
Weiten, 2013  
 
Psychology: Themes 
and variations, 9th 
edition 
involves (1) a 
subjective conscious 
experience (the 
cognitive component) 
accompanied by (2) 
bodily arousal (the 
physiological 
component) and by 
(3) characteristic overt 
expressions (the 
behavioral component 
p. 411 
involves goal-directed 
behavior.  
 
p.388 
 
the stimulation of 
sense organs  
p. 130 
 
Zimbardo et al., 2017  
 
Psychology: Core 
concepts (8th ed.) 
Emotion is a process 
involving four main 
components: 
physiological arousal, 
cognitive 
interpretation, 
subjective 
feelings,and 
behavioral expression 
(…) Emotions are a 
special class of 
motives that help us 
attend to and respond 
to important (usually 
external) situations 
and communicate our 
intentions to others 
p.361 
Motives are internal 
dispositions to act in 
certain ways, although 
they can be influenced 
by multiple factors, 
both internal and 
external.  
p.324 
 
process by which a 
stimulated receptor 
(such as the eyes or 
ears) creates a pattern 
of neural messages that 
represent the stimulus 
in the brain, giving rise 
to our initial 
experience of the 
stimulus.  
p.765 
 
Note:  
1. sign X when the definition has been found missing 
2. in some tables, definitions have logic inconsistency. These inconsistencies (i.e. tautologies or 
equivalences) are explained and highlighted in grey 
3. when the original formulators have been explicitly cited by the authors, they have been 
mentioned in the box and in the references 
4. specific comments have been made below the header in italics (e.g. subdivision of memory in 
long term memory and short-term memory, etc.) 
5. the pages on which the definitions are presented are listed below the definitions. 
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